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STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED 
Whether the trial court erred by giving one party an 
equal share in the proceeds of a personal injury 
judgment received by the other. 
Whether the trial court erred in sharing equally a 
traceable home equity owned by one of the parties 
prior to their marriage. 
Whether the trial court erred in awarding to one party 
occupancy, not ownership which was split equally, of a 
home needed by the other for maintenance of a 
business, when the marriage was childless, neither had 
a greater residential need for the home than the 
other, occupancy of the home gave the party who 
received it no advantage on monthly expenses, and 
relocating the business will cause a substantial 
monthly expense and time loss to the evicted party. 
Whether the court erred in awarding alimony over 
one-half of the husband's disposable monthly income 
when the wife was unemployed but in good health and 
capable of working, had worked before, and, while the 
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parties had been married 16 years, the marriage had 
been childless. 
Whether the court erred by splitting equally between 
the parties a major investment made in a highly 
speculative stock by the wife over the husband's 
objections, by not telling him she had bought it, 
putting it solely in her name, yet using the other 
party's personal asets to do so, when there were 
sufficient assets that the party making such 
speculative investment could have received it in its 
entirety, with its potential of gain or loss, and the 
other party given offsetting conservative assets. 
Whether the trial court doesn't have the duty, when 
circumstances justify it, to look to the future effect 
of a decree, when later proceedings pursuant to 
JO-3-5, Utah Code Annotated, to modify the decree will 
be ineffective to correct the flaws and waste of 
assets inherent in the decree, and whether the 
reviewing court has the power to modify such a decree. 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
NATURE OF THE CASE: 
This is a divorce action* 
PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT: 
The case was tried before Judge J, Dennis Frederick on 
November 16, 1984. He entered judgment February 25, 1985. 
Defendant's Motion to Alter or Amend the Judgment was denied by 
Judge Frederick on April 24, 1985. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The trial courtfs Findings of Fact, Conclusions of 
Law, and Decree of Divorce are attached as Addendum 1. Its 
Bench Ruling is attached as Addendum 3. 
The parties married December 4, 1968. Plaintiff filed 
for divorce, in 198 3. They continued to reside in their Magna, 
Utah, home until trial, plaintiff upstairs and defendant 
downstairs. 
At the time the case was tried on November 16, 1984, 
plaintiff was 59 years old and defendant 51 years old. 
During the 15 years they lived together, the parties 
nad no children. Each had been married before. Defendant has 
never had children. Plaintiff had five children by previous 
marriages whom defendant helped raise. 
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At the time of trial, all of plaintiff's children were 
adult, married and lived away from the parties• 
In the allocation of assets made by the trial judge, 
ne essentially followed the asset list and values of 
plaintiff's Exhibit 5 with some correction of figures as he 
announced from the bench. The end result was the following 
distribution of assets (also attached as Annex 6). 
COURT'S AWARD 
TO WIFE TO HUSBAND 
$31,411 1/2 present home (Magna) 
$17,835 Accounts receivable 
1,000 2 burial lots 
3,000 household furniture 
1,800 1978 Chrysler 
100 1953 Chevrolet pickup 
37,900 Wightman-Clark contract 
(yield $375/month) 
2,000 Brighton Bank account 
16,200 1/2 National Military 
$31,411 
4,200 
1,000 
8,000 
1,000 
1,000 
300 
200 
1,000 
3,000 
4,500 
31,998 
6,400 
400 
7,400 
16,200 
1/2 present home, 
Magna 
Accounts Receivable 
2 burial lots 
Kenworth truck 
Tires 
Tools 
Honda 3 60 
1949 Inter. Pickup 
Boat and trailer 
1974 Ford Pickup with 
camper 
1977 Trailmobile 
Trailer 
Savings 
Savings 
Savings 
Savings 
1/2 National Military 
Underwriter f s stock 
$118,009 $111,846 
Alimony - $800/month 
Magna Home - 1/2 equity to wife. She to pay husband his 1/2 
equity, fixed at $31,411, when plaintiff remarries or five years, 
whichever comes sooner. 
-4-
HUSBANDfS INCOME 
Mr. Naranjofs income as a self-employed truck driver was 
covered for several years. His gross income, after business 
expenses, and before taxes, is as follows on a monthly basis: 
$1408.75 - 1982 Tax returns (Ex. 4) 
$1315.00 - 1983 Tax returns (Ex. 3) 
$2324.59 - Year prior to trial, November, 1983, through October, 
1984 (Defendant's Ex. 18) 
$1889.00 - Defendant's income, April, 1984, through June, 1984 
(Plaintiff's Ex. 7). 
This is also reproduced on Addendum 6. 
Plaintiff had worked before the marriage, (R. 173, L. 
16-21) and intermittently during the marriage at a number of 
different jobs such as grocery checker, clerk, receptionist and 
cashier. (R. 193, L 4-10). Her last job paid $150 gross per week 
for part-time work. (R. 178, L. 5-19). 
At the time of trial, plaintiff was not employed, having 
quit her last job and would take a new job when she could find "a 
good job". (R. 187, L 23-24). She had worked during the marriage 
when she chose to. (R. 193, L 18-21). In the five years prior to 
the divorce she had worked only about one-fourth of the time. (R 
193, L 11-13). The trial court properly found she was "capable of 
employment". (Findings, paragraph 5, Add. IP. 2). 
Defendant is an American of Mexican ancestry. Growing 
up, he worked as a farm laborer. After service in the Army, he 
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Decame a truck driver working for wages. (R. 212, L 6-11) 
During their marriage, defendant purchased a long haul 
diesel tractor and a flat bed trailer, and worked self employed as 
a long-haul lease driver. 
When the parties were first married, they lived in a home 
in Kearns defendant had been purchasing. 
After defendant became self-employed, and had his tractor 
and trailer to house, and he being a diesel mechanic able to do 
maintenance and routine work on the vehicles, (R. 224, L 25-225, L 
9) they moved into a home in Magna, Utah, which was on a 1-1/2 
acre lot. (Ex. 14) 
On the Magna lot, working together, but essentially with 
defendant's money, (R. 180, L 11-18; R. 200, L 22-201, L 6) they 
Duilt a garage large enough to house both the tractor and the 
trailer. Defendant equipped the garage with trucking gear such as 
spare tires and cargo chains, and tools and materials to service 
the vehicles. (R. 224, L25-R.225, L9). 
The garage was larger than the home. (R. 223, L 22-R. 
226, L 15; Ex. 11, 12, 13). 
A current realtor's appraisal on the home was received in 
evidence. (Ex. 14) The realtor commented on the lot containing a 
small well-kept home, but resale of the lot being complicated by 
the large commercial garage on the same property. 
Defendant testified that by having the garage at home he 
could work after runs and on weekends maintaining his equipment 
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and that he would not be able to make ends meet without that 
facility. (R. 223, L 25-225, L 9). 
In 1980, defendant sustained a severe injury. While a 
load of pipe he had delivered was being unloaded at a refinery in 
Colorado, a 40-foot long pipe was dropped by the crane carrying 
it, bounced and smashed defendant's left knee. 
His lawsuit against the refinery for negligence in its 
nandling of the pipe yielded him a $150,000 jury verdict in 1982. 
This was reduced to $120,000 by the jury finding that he had 20% 
comparative negligence. To settle the case rather than endure an 
appeal, defendant agreed to a cash settlement of $110,000 which 
the refinery paid. (Ex. 8, 25) 
The jury verdict following Colorado procedure, was a 
single figure verdict, not broken down into general and special 
damages. (Ex. 8) 
Exhibit 25 includes an accounting letter of June 8, 1982, 
to defendant from his attorney itemizing distribution of the 
$110,000. This is attached as Addendum 4. 
After deducting costs, attorney fees, and reimbursement 
of $18,000 to the Utah State Insurance Fund for Workmen's 
Compensation benefits defendant had received, defendant received a 
net of $61,459.45. 
Other than nine months off work to recuperate from the 
knee injury (R. 205, L 2-5) and its incident operations, defendant 
had continued to, and now does, drive his truck. 
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A letter from defendant's attending physician, Dr. 
Johnathan Home concerning defendant's knee (Ex. 22; attached as 
Addendum 5), stated that his days as a truck driver were numbered, 
and while he might work indefinitely, the knee was deteriorating 
and he might be able to drive only two more years. 
Defendant testified that the knee was steadily becoming 
more painful, that the continual operation of the truck's clutch, 
which is harder to operate than a passenger car's, was constantly 
painful to him, but that even so he was working extra hours to 
make ends meet, aad he would continue to drive as long as he could 
stand the pain. (R. 203, L 6-204, L 1; R. 213, L 25-R 214, L 24; 
R. 227, L 24-R. 231, L9; R. 223, L 1-25; R. 235, L 11-25). 
Defendant put $50,000 of the award in thrift 
certificates. The other $11,459.45 he shared with plaintiff. (R. 
219, L 9-14). 
In putting the $50,000 into thrift certificates, 
defendant put it in his name and plaintiff's, but for the purpose 
of meeting his future medical needs and reduced earning capacity. 
He knew he would not receive future Workman's Compensation nor 
Teanster's benefits. (Addendum 4, paragraph 1; U.C.A. 35-1-62(3), 
R. 212, L 25-213, L 24;Re 216, L 17-R. 217, L 3). 
Plaintiff acknowledged that she knew that the savings 
certificates represented defendant's personal injury proceeds (R. 
196, L 5-R. 197, L 15). Nevertheless, without his knowledge, (R. 
189, L 14-23) plaintiff went to their safety deposit box, took 
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$30,000 of the thrift certificates, which with accumulated 
interest totaled $32,400, and used this to purchase 64,800 shares 
of National Military Underwriters. (R. 182, 18-23; R. 196, L 
17-21). She had first asked him to buy it and he refused to allow 
use of his award for that purpose (R. 196, L 17-197, L 16). 
The district court case number D83-3755 indicates that 
plaintiff filed for divorce in 1983. She purchased this stock in 
1984 (R. 182, L 18-25). 
Plaintiff put the shares in her name alone (R. 183, L 
1-7). , 
She asked at trial that the stocK be awarded to her in 
its entirety (R. 202, L 22-24). She worked for National Military 
Underwriters when she bought the stock and, at trial, thought it 
would be profitable (R. 197, L 20-R. 198, L 6). 
As indicated in Annex 6 and Exhibits 3, 4,7 and 18, 
defendant's income fluctuated as he was self-employed without a 
regular paycheck. The highest figure of his earnings is that 
submitted by himself on Exhibit 18 for the year prior to trial, 
November 1983 through October 1984. This totaled $27,895.08 for 
the year, $2,3 24.59 per month on the average, before taxes. 
Defendant did not have a regular paycheck with itemized 
deductions. His taxes for 1984 were not prepared in November of 
that year when the case was tried. Accordingly, his net income 
has to be approximated. 
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In his counsel's court experience deducting net from 
gross income is a fairly common procedure. This is not submitted 
as law, but as experience for ordinary income brackets. In that 
situation the judge or commissioner usually takes 30-35% off the 
gross to arrive at the net, to cover the three variables-FICA, 
federal tax and state tax. Applied to defendant's monthly gross 
of $2,324.59, this approximation yields a net income of $1,510.98 
to $1,627.21 per month as the maximum earnings his work history 
shows. 
Plaintiff testified in regard to alimony, that defendant 
"can afford $1,000 real easy" (R. 187, L 13-24). 
Defendant testified that notwithstanding his leg pain he 
worked nine hours a day, five to six days a week (R. 221, L 1-24), 
that he had priced a new truck which would be easier for his knee 
(R. 209, L15-23), that if he could afford to pay out $1,000 a 
month, he would have bought the new truck (R. 23 3, L 11-15) and 
would work less hours (R. 233, L 16-18), and that the reason for 
his working such long hours was to make ends meet (R. 233, L 
19-21) . 
The final matter concerning the parties' finances to be 
touched on is the equity in the home in Kearns, plaintiff owned at 
the time of their marriage. He purchased it in 1958 or 1959 (R. 
227, L 21-228, L 3), he made improvements before their marriage 
and made a small downpayment of about $500 or $600 (R. 228, L 
6-18). Further improvements were made after he married plaintiff. 
-10-
When they sold the first home, the Kearns home, they 
sold it on contract for $41,000 in 1974, paying off the $7,800 
first mortgage balance, and carrying the contract entirely 
themselves as an investment, The ouyers defaulted, 
renegotiated and, at trial owed a balance of $37,900 payable at 
$375 per month at 15% interest and a balloon payment of the 
balance due in two years. Defendant's equity is intact in this 
balance (R. 181, L19-R. 182, L 4-R. 187, L 7-11). 
Using the later date of purchase 1959, defendant owned 
the home nine years before his marriage to plaintiff in 1968, 
and sold it six years later in 1974. This equity was $33,200 
based on $41,000 sale price and $7,800 mortgage balance. 
It is impossible to determine the amount of equity 
defendant had in the home at the time he married plaintiff. 
However, there are enough figures to work from, damages being 
formulated on the best rational base. 
Over 15 years ownership a $33,200 equity break down to 
a growth of $2,213 per year. For the six years of ownership 
during the marriage this would total $13,280. One-half of 
that, giving plaintiff a full share, would be $6,640. This 
leaves an equity interest in defendant of $26,560. If the view 
is taken that equity growth during marriage is totally a shared 
asset, even though the home was in defendant's name alone, his 
equity would be $19,917, based on nine years ownership prior to 
the marriage. 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
The trial court's decree erred in (a) awarding alimony 
without a proper basis, (b) sharing defendant's traceable 
premarital asset, his equity in the Kearns' home, on the basis 
that "when parties marry, they agree to--and, in this case did, 
pool their respective assets," (c) sharing one party's personal 
injury award with the other without basis, (d) forcing one 
party to share a major, speculative investment made secretly by 
che other while the divorce was pending, (e) requiring 
defendant to vacate the home with its garage which constitutes 
a financial loss without justification, and (f) the decree sets 
up a situation that will cause present and future economic loss 
which is not remediable under Utah Code Annotated, Section 
JO-3-5, so that to protect the parties the decree should be 
restructured, preferably by the reviewing court• 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE COURT ERRED IN SHARING EQUALLY 
BETWEEN THE PARIES, DEFENDANT'S 
PERSONAL INJURY AWARD. 
The facts are stated at pages 7-8 of the Statement of 
Facts. 
Izatt v. Izatt, Utah, 627 P.2d 49 (1981), recognizes 
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that, Utah not being a community property state, injured 
parties own their personal injury awards as separate, 
non-marital assets. This rule accords with law from other 
jurisdictions such as Amato v. Amato, 434 A.2d 639, (N.J. 
1981); Rickman v. Rickman, 605 P.2d 909 (Az 1980); Burgh v. 
Burgh, 608 P.2d 329 (Az 1980); Luxton v. Luxton, 648 P.2d 
IN.M. 1982) and Brown v. Brown, 675 P.2d 1207 (Wash. 1984). 
If the other party wishes to put on evidence that some 
part of the award should be shared, such as based on the 
family incurring debts due to the injury as was the fact 
situation in Izatt, supra, it is the burden of proof of that 
party to present such evidence as to justify those coming out 
of the separate property of the other. 
Plaintiff introduced no evidence of any kind to show 
any existing debts which had to be reimbursed from defendant's 
fund. She could not. There were no marital debts except for 
the mortgage on the Magna home. (Findings, Paragraph 18, Add. 
1, P. 6) 
The trial judge stated in his bench ruling: 
"Now, I recognize counsel there is some 
disparity in the calculation of the 
respective awards. However, it is my view 
that taking into account the personal 
injury award, because I am unable--the 
evidence does not establish what portion of 
that represented, if any, lost wages vs. 
pain and suffering that the plaintiff, by 
virtue of any award is sharing in that 
award." (Add. 3. P 5) 
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The court repeated its mistaken expression that the 
burden of proof was on the defendant at paragraph 16 of its 
Findings of Fact in which the court stated: 
,f16. The Court finds that defendant was 
awarded a judgment for injuries, in the 
original amount of $110,000 in June, 1982. 
Of this, $18,000 was paid to the Utah State 
Insurance Fund to reimburse lost income and 
medical expenses received by the defendant, 
and after costs and fees, defendant 
received net cash of $61,459. The Court 
finds defendant did not meet his burden of 
showing the amount of this award 
attributable to special damages, which the 
Court determines to be joint marital 
property as lost income, and accordingly, 
the Court finds the whole $61,459 to be 
joint property; $60,000 of this money was 
put in joint saving certificates, two 
$20,000 certificates and two $10,000 
certificates. The Court took into 
consideration the possibility that 
defendant may require future surgery in 
awarding him the majority of the income 
producing assets of the marriage, but 
specifically finds that defendant's 
possible need for surgery is speculative." 
LEmphasis added] (Add. 1, P. 5) 
In so ruling the trial court made errors of law. 
1. The burden is on the uninjured party to show a 
basis for sharing in the award. The court reversed that 
burden. 
2. The court erred on the facts, as the evidence 
proved that there was no lost income nor medical expense 
attributable to the injury. 
rfThe money received is the legal 
substitute for pain, suffering and the 
mental and physical disabilities incurred. 
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It is a right, peculiar to the injured 
person, to seek to be restored, or made 
whole, as he was before the injury. 
The only damages truly shared are those 
discussed earlier, the diminution of the 
marital estate by loss of past wages or 
expenditure of money for medical 
expenses. Any other apportionment is 
unfair distribution.'1 Amato v. Amato, 
supra, at 434 A.2d 642, 643. 
it should be noted that in Amato the uninjured 
spouse had consortium rights. The rationale applies regardless 
though and is the same used in Izatt, supra, where, with the 
total recovery being $97,000, the Utah court held "the fact 
that the $97,000 belongs to defendant is not to be doubted." 
627 P.2d at 51. 
In the case at bar the trial judge made the finding 
that the award because proof hadn't been established as to 
distinction between general and special damages. This is 
punitive. Some part of the award had to be general damages. 
Rather than making effort to distinguish them, or requesting 
such evidence of counsel, the court simply forfeited the award 
from defendant's ownership without a factual basis. 
In doing so the trial court exceeded Izatt which 
made no distinction between general and special damages, but 
rather limited the uninjured spouse to recovery based on proof 
of actual pecuniary loss to the family unit as result of the 
injury. 
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As plaintiff presented no such evidence the sharing 
of the personal injury award should be reversed and it be 
restored entirely to defendant. 
In any event, a careful analysis of the evidence 
shows that the trial court erred on the facts. The evidence is 
fully adequate to indicate that there was no financial loss to 
che family as a result of the injury. 
Special damages are essentially those for wage loss 
and medical expense. 
Defendant lost nine months off work due to the 
injury. (R. 203, I* 2-5) . 
The accounting letter, Addendum 4, on defendant's 
personal injury award states the necessary facts. 
Workmen's Compensation paid defendant $25,000 in 
wage loss and medical expense. Workmen's Compensation covered 
all medical expense. U.C.A. 35-1-81, (Add. 6, P. 4). So there 
was no unmet medical expense. What about wage loss? 
U.C.A. J5-1-65 (Add. 6, P. 3) provides that 
two-thirds of the injured workmen's wage is to be reimbursed by 
Workmen's Compensation for wages in defendant's income range. 
As defendant's highest income at any time in his 
known work history was $2,324.59 per month, that would be an 
income loss over the nine months of $20,921.31. The 
unreimbursed one-third of this would be $6,973.77. 
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The $6,973.77 is not an unreimbursed loss to the 
family. Defendant put $11,459.45 of his award, leaving the 
$50,000 that he put in thrift certificates, directly into the 
joint funds for himself and plaintiff. This exceeds the 
special damage loss by $4,485.68. 
Thus, the trial judge1s statement that the special 
damages were not determined and were not reimbursed is simply 
without foundation in the evidence. The only thing the 
evidence doesn't show is any existing debt attributable to 
defendant's injury. The Izatt threshhold is not crossed. 
While the trial judge is given wide latitude of 
deference to his findings of fact, they still must be supported 
by the record, English v. English, Utah, 565 P.2d 411. 
It should be noted that the trial court made no 
finding that the remaining $50,000 of the personal injury award 
became joint property by the defendant putting it into savings 
in his name and plaintiff's. The trial judge did so only on 
the basis that, as he couldn't distinguish general from special 
damages, the whole was shared (Findings, Paragraph 16, Add. 1, 
P. 5). This ruling is correct as the money was entirely 
traceable to that award as the trial judge specifically found, 
and there was no evidence of any kind that he shared it with 
plaintiff, but rather that he was saving it against the future 
sequela incident to his injured knee (R. 196, L 5-21; R. 217, L 
9-23; R. 218, L 1-11). 
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ARGUMENT 
POINT II. 
THE COURT'S AWARD TO PLAINTIFF OF $800 
PER MONTH PERMANENT ALIMONY SHOULD BE 
REDUCED, OR ELIMINATED, AS IT IS CONTRARY 
TO THE EVIDENCE, CONTRARY TO LAW, AND IN 
THE LONG RUN DOES NOT SERVE PLAINTIFF. 
The facts are stated at pages 4, 5,7 and 10. 
In English v. English, Utah, 565 P.2d 411 (1977), a 
three factor test was enunciated to determine the 
appropriateness of an alimony award. The elements weres 
1. The wife's financial condition and economic needs; 
2. The wife's ability to contribute financially; 
3. The husband's ability to provide. 
In the recent cases of Olsen v. Olsen, 15 UT Adv. Rep. 
8, and Jones v. Jones, Utah, 700 P.2d 1072, the English, 
supra, formula has been approved and given further definition, 
and rhe reviewing court has further enunciated its own 
prerogatives on appeal as being that the court must have 
adequate findings of fact on each point of the formula, that 
che customary deference to the findings is not given if they 
do not cover the necessary factual groundwork and that if the 
decree is inadequate or short-sighted, that the court can make 
findings of fact on its own. Penington v. Penington, 16 UT 
Adv. Rep. 5. Boals v. Boals, Utah, 664 P.2d 1191 (1983); 
DeRose v.DeRose, 19 U.2d 77, 79, 426 P.2d 221, 222 (1967); 
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Dogu v, Dogu, Utah, 652 P.2d 1308 (1982); and Beals v. Beals, 
Jtah, 682 P.2d 862 (1984). 
Plaintiff's financial declaration indicated that her 
monthly expenses were $1,098.13, a figure she stood on at 
trial. (Plaintiff's Ex. 6; R. 188, L 5-10). This meets the 
first element of English, supra, particularly as the trial 
court made no finding as to any other sum she needed. 
Sorensen v. Sorensen, 18 U.2d 102, 417 P.2d 118 (1966). 
Graziano v. Graziano, 7 U.2d 181, 321 P.2d 931 (1958). 
The court's award gave her $17,83 5 in accounts 
receivable, $16,200 in National Military Underwriters stock 
(whatever its value), $2,000 in savings, and the 
Wightman-Clark contract on the parties' Kearns home which paid 
$375 per month. 
The trial court did not determine the monthly 
financial benefit plaintiff would receive from these assets. 
They have to be at least the $37 5 from the Wightman-Clark 
contract. Deducting that from her $1,100 ($1,098.13) monthly 
expense that she has, leaves a monthly financial need on her 
part of $725. 
We turn to the second element of the English test-
plaintiff's ability to provide for herself. 
In the court's findings of fact, it stated: 
"5. Plaintiff is 59 years of age, has ulcers 
but otherwise is in good health, is not 
presently employed, but is capable of 
employment. She has worked during the year 
1984, and gave no reason for being unemployed 
at the time of trial." (Annex 1, page 2) 
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Plaintiff admitted that at her last employment she had 
earned $150 per week, for National Military Underwriters, and 
that this was only part time employment. She wouldn't commit 
to how many hours she worked. (R.178, L 5-19) This works out 
to $650 per month. If she worked 25 hours per week, projected 
to a 40-hour week, she would earn $1,040 per month. 
Plaintiff also testified that she would take employment 
when she could "find a good job." (R. 187, L 23-24). Could 
she not take a lesser job while looking for a better? 
The trial court entirely overlooked the second part of 
the English formula--the ability of the wife to contribute to 
her own needs. Lacking this finding, it has no basis to 
determine the amount of alimony she needs to supplement her 
income from her own work and investments. 
In regard to the third part of the English formula, the 
nusband's ability to provide, the court in its findings of 
fact, paragraph 6 (Annex 1, page 2) acknowledged receipt of the 
letter of Dr. Home concerning defendant's knee but stated that 
Decause Dr. Home couldn't be certain as to when defendant 
would be unable to drive a truck, that the matter was 
speculative and the court would not made allowance for it. In 
the court's bench ruling it stated: 
?fThis court can't predict what will happen in 
the future with regard to the employablity of 
either party. It must content itself with 
the circumstances as they now exist. But, of 
course, as counsel are aware, this court 
maintains continuing jurisdiction to modify 
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any order that it enters with regard to 
circumstances that may develop in the future 
if they meet the test of material or 
substantial change in circumstances." 
(Add- 3, Page 2) 
The court had evidence in two forms before it in regard 
to defendant's future employability. 
It was the testimony of defendant that each time he 
drove his truck, he was in pain and didnft know how long he 
could continue. (R. 203, L 2-R. 204, L 1; R. 222, L 1-R. 223, 
L 9; R. 233, L 19-25). 
The other form of evidence is Dr. Home's letter. 
Dr. Home summarized his findings by stating: 
"I believe he probably will be able to 
continue working for 5 or 10 years, but his 
condition may deteriorate rapidly, and it may 
be only another 2 to 5 years. 
His functional ability is already impaired 
and will continue to become more impaired in 
the next few years to come. At the present 
rime, he cannot perform vigorous activity. 
He can sit in the truck, push the clutch and 
reasonably function in that capacity, but he 
cannot walk more than a few blocks without 
discomfort increasing." (Add. 5) 
The probability that defendant's work will be reduced in 
the foreseeable future is too great for the court to "content 
itself with the circumstances as they now exist.'1 
With the variations in defendant's income, as shown on 
Addendum 6, it would have been appropriate for the trial court 
to make a finding as to that income so as to measure 
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defendant's ability to provide. A review of a self-employed 
person's history of earnings and a finding as to present 
ability to provide is proper, in fact required, by the trial 
court. Jones v. Jones, Utah, 8Ut.Adv.Rep. 14 (1985); Olson v. 
Olson, supra; English v. English, supra. Rather than doing so, 
che court simply stated in Findings of Fact: 
r,7. Based on the length of the marriage and 
the disparity in the parties1 earning 
capacity, the court finds it reasonable that 
defendant pay to plaintiff the sum of $800 per 
month as alimony." (Add. 1, P. 2) 
In addition to the court's failing to follow the law as 
established in English and its successor cases, there are two 
other very serious flaws in the award of alimony. 
The purpose of alimony is not to punish one party nor 
reward another. English, supra at 411. Plaintiff does not 
need to work in order to meet her monthly needs. If she does, 
her alimony will almost certainly be reduced. She doesn't 
work. 
It is a matter of her having an adequate income through 
ner labor, or through defendant's. 
At the same time, defendant has to work, overtime, while 
in pain. (R. 221, L 1-25). This is punitive. 
The other flaw of the present decree is that in the long 
run the award of alimony hurts both parties, plaintiff as well 
as defendant. 
A trial court has an obligation to take a long-sighted 
view of the terms of a divorce decree, as seeking relief in 
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contempt or under 30-3-5 are not a panacea in all cases. 
As an example in Beals v. Beals, supra, the reviewing 
court approved the trial judge's giving a wife an 
extraordinarily large property settlement rather than alimony. 
In affirming, the court held that the trial judge properly, in 
view of the husband's refusal to comply with the previous 
support orders of the court, could anticipate future difficulty 
in the payment of support or alimony, and the alternative of an 
award of extra property in lieu thereof was justified, as that 
could serve as future alimony. 
In Dogu v. Dogu, supra, the husband's uncertain state of 
nealth justified remand to have the trial court secure the 
wife's alimony in the event she survived the husband. The 
probabilities in that case are similar to this case. 
If the trial court doesn't consider the future, its 
decree can be restructured on appeal. 
"While the determinations of the trial court 
are given deference and not disturbed lightly, 
changes should be made if that seems essential 
to the accomplishment of the desired 
objectives of the decree: chat is, to make 
such an arrangement of the property and 
economic resources of the parties that they 
will have the best possible opportunity to 
reconstruct their lives on a happy and useful 
Dasis for themselves and their children. This 
is such a case." DeRose v. DeRose, supra. 
Defendant seeks such relief here. 
While the trial court properly stated that it could not 
find when defendant would be unable to drive a truck, a person 
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doesn't get $150,000 for an injured knee unless that knee is 
severely injured. 
The court's award of $800 per month alimony requires 
defendant to consume assets that he could otherwise conserve 
for his future days of reduced income. As he works overtime to 
"make ends meet" (R. 233, L 11-25), his driving future can be 
extended if he could reduce his working hours and rest his 
knee. At the same time the award does not serve plaintiff. 
Social Security is not based on the amount of alimony 
one has received. 
Social Security is based on one's average earnings. If 
plaintiff spends the next years unemployed, then two things 
will happen. One is certain, one probable. 
First, defendant will obtain a reduction in alimony when 
he is unable to drive a truck. 
Second, plaintiff, 59 when the decree was entered, will 
be unable to obtain Social Security in any adequate sum. This 
is a limited future asset, but should be seized as it pays each 
month for life. She has been awarded substantial but not 
unlimited assets. She will have to draw on them when she can't 
work. When these are exhausted she may become a public charge, 
or live very frugally to avoid exhausting them. This does not 
serve her, defendant, nor the public. 
This presents a clear, probable future situation that 
cannot be remedied by resort to the court under U.C.A. 30-3-5 
-24-
(Add. 2), for relief based on a change of circumstance. The 
probable circumstances are that neither party will be capable 
of producing substantial income, and neither party will have 
adequate resources to fall back on. U.C.A. 30-3-5 will be 
useless as an equitable tool. It will be closing the barn door 
after. 
Plaintiff does not have all the earning years in the 
world left ahead of her. It makes it ail the more imperative, 
she being in good health, other than ulcers, and employable, 
that she earn as much as she can while she can. 
It is equally imperative, that defendant be allowed to 
reduce his working hours and to conserve as many assets as he 
can to protect his future. While he is 51, his leg can be 
fairly stated as being much older, and his ability to earn, 
depends on him being physically capable, as he has no earning 
expertise in his entire history other than that based on 
physical work. (R. 212, L 5-11). 
The generality offered by the trial court in its Bench 
Ruling that the court ''maintains continuing jurisdiction to 
modify any order that it enters with regard to circumstances 
that may develop in the future..." (Add. 3, P. 2) tends both 
parties towards an impoverished old age. What help does 
"continuing jurisdiction" realistically offer? 
There is no better time for the parties to work as much 
as they can than now. In fact, there is no other time. 
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In Gale v. Gale, 123 U 277, 278, 258 P.2d 986, 987, 
{1953) Justice Crockett observed that the problem with divorce 
is that "when one blanket is cut to fit two beds, it seldom 
will cover them both." His opinion went on to point out that 
the obligation of the court is to tailor its cutting so as to 
cover both beds as well as possible. 
Defendant submits that plaintiff has little, if any, 
need for alimony at the present time. On the other hand she 
might very well need substantial alimony in the future if there 
is any condition where she cannot work while the defendant 
still can. 
While defendant, to protect his own future, thinks he 
has offered defendant enough assets (See Argument Point VI) to 
meet her future needs, and certainly a far better position than 
when she married him, as he seeks equity, he must be prepared 
to do equity, so offers alimony in the sum of $100 per month, 
with the knowledge that it can be increased in the future. 
Basis for the $100 per month alimony is that this adds 
not only to the $375 per month that plaintiff can obtain from 
the Wightman-Clark contract but also her accounts receivable 
another $32,400 he proposes she receive from the National 
Military Underwriters1 stock. To this is added her own ability 
to earn. This should well place plaintiff in a position where 
she will be able to save some hundreds of dollars per month if 
she remains at her present level of expenditure. 
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A final thought. On the above figures, plaintiff's $800 
per month alimony is about one-half of defendant's maximum 
disposable income. The thought though is that now that the 
trial court has required defendant to vacate the home, with his 
vehicles and equipment, his disposable income has to become 
greatly reduced by obtaining comparable storage space and 
comparable service facilities, or paying for servicing. This 
leaves the decree's effect as being that plaintiff is now 
receiving more than half of defendant's disposable income for a 
childless 16-year marriage. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT AWARDING 
TO DEFENDANT HIS PREMARITAL ASSET OF A 
HOME EQUITY 
In its Bench Ruling the trial court stated: 
"It is this court's view that when parties 
marry, they agree to--and, in this case, did 
pool their respective assets in an effort to 
better their marriage. To attempt to 
reconstruct each item attributed throughout 
the course of the marriage as well as the 
items brought into the marriage by the 
parties, in the court's view would not be 
productive or fruitful." 
(Annex 3, page 2, L. 9-15) 
Does marriage "pool" assets? 
Defendant's equity in the home he owned at the time of 
the parties' marriage was traceable. The facts are covered in 
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the Statement of Facts at pages 10 & 11. 
In Preston v. Preston, Utah 646 P.2d 705 (1982), the 
trial courtfs sharing of a real property interest was reversed 
on the principle that each party should receive the real or 
personal property he or she brought to the marriage. There, 
the parties had an equity of $18,000 in a cabin built during 
the marriage. $9,000 of that was traceable to assets the 
husband had prior to the marriage. The court directed that 
spouse should receive credit for that $9,000. 
Judicial opinions have social implications. 
If the trial courtfs ruling that parties "pool their 
assets" by marriage receives general application, middle-aged 
people, those with considerable assets, and those with limited 
assets such as divorced women raising children whose only 
financial asset is the home in which the children live, would 
all be reluctant to remarry. 
The court1s Findings of Fact are entirely silent as to 
any factual basis for the court determining that the parties 
had merged their premarital assets. The parties had not sought 
recovery of personal assets each brought into the marriage, 
such as their minor savings, furniture and vehicles. Through 
the 16 years of the marriage these consumables had been merged 
and consumed. 
Defendant's home equity was not. 
-28-
Defendant's equity is preserved untouched, like a fly in 
amber, in the $37,900 balance still owed on the purchase of 
that Kearns home, the Wightman-Clark contract. 
As indicated in Exhibit 23, the letter from 
Wightman-Clarkfs attorneys, the balance remains so large 
because the buyers have had financial difficulty. At any rate 
the equity is traceable, whether defendant be given that asset, 
or some other offsetting asset. 
The question is with the evidence before the trial court 
is there an adequate basis to determine the amount of 
defendant's equity? 
Uncertainty in damages is not a bar to their recovery, 
as if they are not awarded, there is as much an injustice, as 
if they are awarded too generously. Rather, if there is a 
rational oasis for making the determination, even though 
uncertain, and being an approximation, it is better than making 
no determination at all, and is acceptable as a matter of law. 
Terry v. Panek, Utah, 631 P.2d 896 (1981); Gould v. Mountain 
States Telephone & Telegraph Co., 6 U.2d 197, 309 P.2d 902 
(1951)} Winsness v. M.J. Conoco Distributors, Utah, 593 P.2d 
1303 (1979); Cook Associates, Inc., v. Warnick, Utah, 664 P.2d 
1161, 1166 (1983). 
Using the single approximation that equity growth in the 
home was constant through the years of its ownership, a 
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rational figure of $19,917, as worked out in the Findings of 
Fact at page 11, is appropriate. 
This method of computing the equity growth, damages as 
it were, is imperfect, but it is a rational method and the best 
available under the circumstances. 
As the trial court made no effort to determine the 
equity shares of plaintiff and defendant in the Kearns home, 
rather relying in lieu of Findings, that by marriage the 
parties "pool their respective assets/1 the court1s treating 
the entire home equity as a joint asset is clearly error and 
not subject to favorable review by the court, but rather the 
reviewing court should it make its independent finding of fact 
based on the above figures, or should remand to the trial court 
for findings by the court. DeRose v. DeRose, supra, Dogu v. 
Dogu, supra, Beals v. Beals, supra. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT IV 
PLAINTIFF SHOULD RECEIVE THE ENTIRE 
$32,400 INVESTMENT IN NATIONAL MILITARY 
UNDERWRITERS, AND DEFENDANT RECEIVE 
OTHER ASSETS 
The court divided equally between the parties, $16,200 
each, the investment plaintiff had made of $3 2,400 in National 
Military Underwriters. 
The facts are stated in the Statement of Facts at pages 
7-9. 
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The reason that plaintiff made the investment is that 
she testified that during 1983 and 1984 she worked as 
secretary-receptionist for Ben Kirsling, that National Military 
Underwriters was his company, she was very familiar with it, 
had respect for Mr. Kirsling and felt his company had great 
prospects for gain as an investment. (R. 178, L 5-12; R. 196, 
L 24-R. 198, L 6). 
Why should the court allocate this investment equally 
between the parties? If the stock had made her rich, being in 
her name alone, it seems that she had no intent of sharing it 
with defendant. She still hopes it will be profitable. (R. 
197, L 20-R. 198, L6). It is of course a speculative 
investment, but a gamble she willingly made. The problem is 
that she used his money, not hers. 
On defendant's part, there is no testimony in the 
trascript that he spends lavishly. Rather, as above indicated, 
he works overtime trying to make ends meet and is very 
concerned about his future due to his knee problems. He was 
unwilling to speculate. That is why he put the personal injury 
award into rock solid thrift certificates. 
Plaintiff has made her choice. She said that she gave 
nerself a "prior distribution" of her share of the estate by 
buying the National Military Underwriters stock. (R. 189, L 
11-16). During trial she asked the court for all this stock. 
(R. 202, L 22-24). Fine. There is no reason the trial court 
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should interfere with the choice that she has made, nor force 
half the choice on defendant. 
Defendant prays she be given all this stock, and he an 
offsetting asset-preferably from her equity in the Magna home 
and garage. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT V 
DEFENDANT SHOULD HAVE BEEN AWARDED 
OCCUPANCY AND OWNERSHIP OF THE PARTIES1 
HOME IN MAGNA WITH PLAINTIFF BEING 
GIVEN OFFSETTING ASSETS FOR HER EQUITY. 
Defendant entered the marriage owning a home. He leaves 
without a home. 
Plaintiff entered the marriage without a home. She 
leaves with a home. 
The facts are stated more fully in the Statement of 
Facts at pages 6, 7 and 10. 
The home in Magna is on a 1-1/2 acre lot. Defendant 
built a garage there big enough to hold in one bay his 40-foot 
trailer and in another bay his tall diesel tractor. The garage 
is larger than the modest home, (R. 223, L 22-24) and as shown 
in Exhibits 11, 12 and 13, photographs of the home and garage. 
Defendant testified that he needs the garage to work 
profitably and testified at length about all the work that he 
does on his truck and trailer at home, doing most of the work 
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and maintenance necessary, and that he works on the equipment 
between each run and the next. (R. 223, L 22-R. 224, L 12). 
Having the garage at the home has the added advantage of 
time and convenience to defendant. His truck is always there 
to work on and he can go directly from home to the road. 
Again applying the analogy made by Justice Crockett in 
Gale, supra, when the parties have mature years, an uncertain 
future, and limited assets, as the parties do here, it is 
prudent to cut the blanket in such a way as to conserve assets. 
The garage should not stand empty, a waste of commerical 
space, while defendant goes out and pays to rent that very same 
space and servicing facility. 
The trial court made no finding of fact, nor comment in 
its Bench Ruling, as to why it awarded plaintiff a five-year 
occupancy of the home. This arbitrary order, standing on no 
enunciated factual basis, is not entitled to deference on 
appeal, so review should be based simply on the record. Dogu 
v. Dogu, supra. 
A second persuasive reason to award defendant the home 
is that he has a larger equity in it than plaintiff. 
Defendant's proposed property distribution will be that 
among major assets plaintiff receive the $32,400 in the 
National Military Underwriters stock, and the $37,900 in the 
Wightman-Clark contract. With that allowed plaintiff, he can 
properly be awarded the entire equity in the Magna home. 
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There is another very important factor to be considered 
in regard to the award of the home* This is similar to the 
problem inherent in Argument Point II on the waste of assets. 
Here the court directed plaintiff to pay defendant his 
one-half equity, $31,411.00 in five years, or sooner if she 
remarried. (Findings Paragraph 10, Add. 1, page 3) 
How is plaintiff to pay the money in five years? She111 
have to dispose of the Wightman/Clark Contract proceeds, 
$37,900, or sell the home. Neither is a good solution. If she 
disposes of her other assets to buy out defendant's equity, she 
leaves herself in the house, but cash poor. If she sells the 
home, it should have been awarded to defendant in the first 
place, to avoid his wasting money on similar space for the five 
intervening years. 
Defendant did not vacate the home. He lived there, in 
the basement, until trial so that neither party has acquired a 
superior possessory interest based on long, sole, occupancy. 
IR. 178A, L 7-14). 
It should be noted that on Exhibit 6, Plaintiff's 
Monthly Expense Statement, she has expenses directly related to 
the home totaling $554.13. These include $200 per month 
payments on the mortgage (with a $12,000 balance this will not 
be paid off in the next five years), $52.97 a month taxes, 
$11.16 insurance, $50 maintenance and utilities of $240 a 
month. 
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For $5b4 a month, particularly because the house is so 
small (Ex. 14), plaintiff could rent a comparable apartment. 
If plaintiff were young and raising children, the 
situation would be different. She is not. If not yet, soon, 
maintaining the home's 1-1/2 acre lot will be a burden for her. 
This issue comes within the concepts previously argued 
of conservation of assets, and a decree that is designed to 
serve long-range interests. Dogu v.Dogu, supra. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT VI 
THE REVIEWING COURT SHOULD 
'REDISTRIBUTE THE ASSETS 
Where it is clear that the trial court has not based its 
decision on express findings of fact so as to guide the 
reviewing court, those findings are not entitled to deference. 
DeRose v. DeRose, supra, Boals v. Boals, supra, Pennington v. 
Pennington, supra. 
When the ruling of the trial court fails to accomplish 
the essential objectives of the decree of divorce, that is to 
arrange the property and economic resources of the parties to 
their best advantage for their future life, it is the 
prerogative of the reviewing court to make findings to 
accomplish these goals. Dogu v. Dogu, supra. 
This is something the reviewing court does with 
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reluctance, but due here to the parties1 ages, the amount of 
litigation that has gone on, their limited resources, the 
clarity of the issues, and the fact that defendant proposes to 
plaintiff more than her share of assets, defendant submits the 
following as a restructured decree for approval by the court. 
Defendant accepts the valuations made by the trial 
court. 
The trial court found the partiesf assets to total 
$229,855, and awarded $111,846 of this to plaintiff and 
$118,009 to defendant. 
Defendant is entitled to $50,000, his personal injury 
award, and $19,920 for the equity in the Kearns home. This 
totals $69,920 in separate assets. He waives interest on the 
$32,400 that plaintiff wrongfully appropriated from him. 
Deducting this from the total assets of $229,855 leaves 
a joint marital estate of $159,935. 
The figures are laid out in Addendum 6. Defendant 
proposes plaintiff receive the following: 
$ 17,835.00 Account Receivable 
1,000.00 2 burial plots 
1,500.00 1/2 household furniture 
1,800.00 1978 Chrysler 
100.00 1953 Chevrolet pickup 
37,900.00 Wightman-Clark contract 
32,400.00 All National Military 
Underwriters stock 
$ 92,535.00 
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This totals to plaintiff $92,535.00 leaving to 
plaintiff, from the joint marital estate, $67,400. 
It puts plaintiff in a cash position where she can 
invest or draw earnings as she sees fit. * 
It puts defendant in the position where he has the house 
and garage to operate his business. 
Defendant does ask for one-half the household furniture. 
The trial court awarded it all to her without a finding (Add. 
6). 
While defendant would be pleased to be relieved from his 
offer of alimony of $100 per month as plaintiff has no present 
need for it, he proposes alimony as in his Argument, Point II. 
The difference between this proposal and the court's 
decree is that it will better conserve assets, and enhance 
income production, during the next important, limited, years. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant prays chat his proposed distribution be 
accepted by the court. 
That failing, he prays award to him of his equity in the 
Kearns home, the $50,000 personal injury award with interest 
until delivered, 1/2 the household furnishings, occupancy of 
the Magna home and garage, reduction or elimination of alimony 
and for an equal distribution of the other assets. 
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As the third alternative, defendant prays tnat the 
judgment of the trial court be reversed as to one or all of the 
above points and the matter remanded. This is a third choice, 
as defendant would prefer to end litigation. 
Defendant submits to the consideration of the court the 
award of fees and costs in view of plaintifffs handling of his 
personal injury award fund. 
DATED September 19, 1985. 
Respectfully submitted, 
^^3^9?^^ 
SAMUEL KING 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
This is to certify that four true and correct copies 
of the foregoing were mailed to Kathryn Schuler Denholm, 
attorney for plaintiff/respondent, 660 South 200 East, Suite 
100, Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, U. S. Mail, postage prepaid, 
September 19, 1985. 
SAMUEL KI1 
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IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
HELEN NARANJO, * FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
Plaintiff, * CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
-vs - * 
30SE L. NARANJO, * Civil No. D83-3755 
Defendant . * 
This matter came for trial before the Honorable Dennis 
Frederick on the 16th day of November, 1984. Plaintiff 
appeared with counsel, Kathryn Schuler Denholm; Defendant 
appeared with counsel, Sam King, the Court having received 
testimony and exhibits, the matter having been argued and 
submitted, the Court being fully advised mow makes the 
following Findings of Fact: 
1. Plaintiff and defendant are each actual and bonafide 
residents of Salt Lake County, Utah and have been such for 
more than three months immediately proceeding the filing of 
the complaint in this action. 
2. The parties are husband and wife having been married 
on December 4, 1968 at Summit County, Utah. 
3. There are no children of the marriage and none are 
expected. 
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4. Each of the parties has caused the other great 
emotional suffering and distress and each is entitled to a 
Decree of Divorce from the other. 
5. Plaintiff is 59 years of age, has ulcers but is 
otherwise in good health, is not presently employed, but is 
capable of employment. She has worked during the year 1984, 
and gave no reason for being unemployed at the time of 
trial. Defendant is a long-line truck driver who owns his 
own diesel tractor truck and a flat-bed trailer. His gross 
income in the 12 months prior to trial, November, 1983, 
through October, 1984, was $75,522 and his net income was 
$27,905, his business expenses consisting mainly of fuel, 
tires, parts,repairs and maintenance. 
6. A letter from Dr. Jonathon H o m e dated November 5, 
1984, was received in evidence, Exhibit 22, which stated 
that defendant has an injured left knee which will require 
first arthroscopic debridement and may require arthroplasty 
or total knee replacement in the future, but the letter is 
not specific as to when these procedures will occur and, as 
to the arthroplasty, whether it will ever occur. 
Accordingly, the present findings of the court cannot 
include present consideration of his physical problem. 
7. Based upon the length of the marriage and the 
disparity in the parties 1 earning capacity, the Court finds 
it is reasonable that defendant pay to plaintiff the sum of 
$800 per month as alimony. 
8. The parties have acquired a home located at 7593 
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West 3500 South, Magna, Utah, having a fair market value at 
the time of trial of $75,000, subject to a first mortgage. 
The equity based thereon is determined by the court to be 
$62,2*2. 
9. The home of the parties includes an oversize garage 
built and used by the parties for storage and maintenance of 
defendants diesel tractor and trailer. No testimony was 
elicited as to the reasonable rental value of equivalent 
accomodat ions. 
10. It is reasonable that plaintiff be awarded use and 
possession of the home subject to the morgage obligation 
thereon and a lien in favor of the denfendant in the sum of 
$31,121. Defendant's lien shall be payable upon the first of 
the following contingencies? 
a. Plaintiff's remarriage; 
b. Plaintiff's cohabitation in the home with a man not 
her husband; 
c. Plaintiff's sale of the home, subject to a first 
right of refusal in the defendant; 
d. Plaintiff ceases to occupy the home as her principal 
res idence or; 
e. The expiration of five years from the date of entry 
of the Decree in this case. 
No interest shall accrue on the defendant's equity 
interest in the home pending the expiration of any of the 
above contingencies. 
11. The parties hold a real estate contract from 
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Wightman-Clark with a balance due them of $37,900. This 
should be awarded to plaintiff, together with all funds paid 
prior to trial and held by plaintiff at the time of trial. 
12. The parties have loaned $17,800 to plaintiff fs 
children and their husbands and $4,2300 to defendant's 
business associates. 
13. It is further reasonable that plaintiff be awarded 
one half the stock in United Military Underwriters and that 
she have the stock reissued as separate certificates 
deliverable to herself and to the defendant, all household 
furnishings and effects now in the home of the parties, the 
1978 Chrysler automobile, the 1953 Chevrolet truck, the 
right to collect loans to her children and their families in 
the approximate amount of $17,800, two burial lots at 
Memorial Estated, approximately $9,835 held in a savings 
account and consisting of proceeds of the Whiteman Clark 
contract received prior to the date of the trial, all life 
and cancer poicies in her name subject to payment of 
premiums and her personal effects and property. 
14. It is reasonable that defendant be awarded time 
certificates: #146732128 and #146013271, savings accounts: 
#143009199, #063003065 and #143000977, all interest in his 
business as a trucker including his diesei tractor, flatbed 
trailer, tools and equipment, his retirement plan if any, 
the 1957 Mitchell boat with trailer, 1949 International 
pickup, Honda motorcycle, 1974 Ford pickup with camper, his 
persoal belongings and effects, trailmobile trailer and 
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approximately $4,200 loaned to his business associated and 
fr iends . 
15. It is reasonable that defendant be ordered of 
vacate the home of the parties and remove his equipment 
therefrom within a reasonable but prompt time, not later 
that December 1, 1984. 
16. The Court finds that defendant was awarded a 
judgment for injuries, in the original amount of $110,000 in 
June, 1982. Of this, $18,000 was paid to the Utah State 
Insurance Fund to reimburse lost income and medical expenses 
received by the defendant, and after costs and fees, 
defendant received net cash of $61,459. The Court finds 
defendant did not meet his burden of showing the amount of 
this award attributable to special damages, which the Court 
determines to be joint marital property as lost income, and 
accordingly, the Court finds the whole $61,459 to be joint 
property; $60,000 of this money was put in joint saving 
certificates, two $20,000 certificates and two $10,000 
certificates. The Court took into consideration the 
possibility that defendant may require future surgery in 
awarding him the majority of the income producing assets of 
the marriage-, but specifically finds that defendant's 
possible need for surgery is speculative. 
17. The Court finds that, because there are no children 
of the marriage, and as a result of other circumstances 
testified to by the parties, the Decree of Divorce to be 
entered herein should be made final upon entry. 
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18. There are no debts of the marriage; each of the 
parites should hold the other harmless of any obligations 
separately incurred by him or her. 
Whereupon, the Court having made its Findings of Fact 
now makes the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Each of the parties should be awarded a Decree of 
Divorce from the other upon the grounds of mental cruelty 
the same to become final upon entry. 
2. Defendant should be ordered to pay the plaintiff the 
sum of $800 per month as alimony. 
3. Plaintiff should be awarded the home located at 7593 
West 3500 South, Magna, Utah, together with all equity 
therein subject to the mortgage obligation thereon and a 
lien in favor of the defendant in the sum of $31,121. 
Defendant's lien should be payable upon the first of the 
foil owing contingencies: 
a. Plaintiff's remarriage; 
b. Plaintiff's cohabitation in the home with a man 
not her husband; 
c. Plaintiff's sale of the home subject to the 
first right of refusal in the defendant; 
d. Plaintiff ceases to occupy the home as her 
principal residence or; 
e. The expiration of five years from the date of 
entry of the Decree in this case. No interest shall accrue 
on the defendant's equity interest in the home pending the 
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expiration of any of the above contingencies. 
*. Plaintiff should be awarded all proceeds of the real 
estate contract with Whiteman Clark said contract having a 
balance of approximately $37,900 including sums collected 
and held in savings at the time of trial and all future 
proceeds of said contract. 
5. Plaintiff should be awarded one-half the stock in 
United Military Underwriters and have the balance of the 
stock reissued as a separate certificate deliverable to the 
defendant. It is futher reasonable that plaintiff be awarded 
all household furnishings and effects now in her possession, 
the 1978 Chrysler automobile, the 1953 Chevrolet truck, the 
right to collect loans to her children and their famlies in 
the approximate amount of $17,800, two burial lots at 
Memorial Estates, all life and cancer policies in her name 
subject to payment of premiums and her personal effects and 
proper ty . 
6. The defendant should be awarded time certificates: 
#1*6732128 and #1*6013271, savings accounts: #1*3009199, 
#063003065 and #1*3000977, all interest in his business as a 
trucker including his diesel tractor, flatbed trailer, tools 
and equipment, his retirement plan if any, the 1957 Mitchell 
boat with trailer, 19*9 International pickup, Honda 
motorcycle, 197* Ford pickup with camper, his personal 
belongings and effects, trailmobile trailer and 
approximately $*,200 loaned to his business associates and 
fr iends . 
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7. Defendant should be ordered to vacate the home of 
the parties and remove his equipment therefrom within a 
reasonable but prompt time not later than December 1, 198*. 
8. The Court concludes as a matter of law that the net 
proceeds of defendant's personal injury action is a joint 
asset of the marriage. 
9. Each of the parties should be ordered to pay the 
debts separately incurred by him or her and hold the other 
harmless thereon. 
!> day of DATED this 2 #/gvMw , 1985. 
By the Court: 
&?m*si ; 
Judge 
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Judge Frederick 
KATHRYN SCHULER DENHOLM 0866 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
660 South 200 East, Suite 100 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephones 534-1035 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT, SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
HELEN NARANJO, 
Plainti ff , 
-vs -
JOSE L. NARAN30, 
Defendant , 
* DECREE OF DIVORCE 
* Civil No. D83-3755 
This matter came for trial before the Honorable Dennis 
Frederick on the 16th day of November, 1984* Plaintiff 
appeared with counsel, Kathryn Schuler Denholm; Defendant 
appeared with counsel, Sam King, the Court having received 
testimony and exhibits, the matter having been argued and 
submitted, the Court being fully advised, more than 90 days 
having elapsed since the filing of this action, having made 
its Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law now therefore it 
is hereby ORDERED ADJUDGED AND DECREED: 
lo Each of the parties is awarded a Decree of Divorce 
from the other upon the grounds of mental cruelty, the same 
to become final upon entry, 
2. Defendant is ordered to pay the Plaintiff the sum of 
$800 per month as alimony. 
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3. Plaintiff is awarded the home located at 7593 West 
3500 South, Magna, Utah together will all equity therein 
subject to the mortgage obligation thereon and a lien in 
favor of the Defendant in the sum of $31,121. Defendant's 
lien is payable upon the first of the following 
con t ingencies t 
a. Plaintiff's remarriage; 
b. Plaintiff's cohabitation in the home with a man 
not her husband; 
c. Plaintiff's sale of the home subject to the 
first right of refusal in the Defendant; 
d. Plaintiff ceases to occupy the home as her 
principal residence or; 
e. The expiration of five years from the date of 
entry of the Decree in this case 
No interest shall accrue on the Defendant's equity interest 
in the home pending the expiration of any of the above 
cont ingencies. 
4. Plaintiff is awarded all proceeds of the real estate 
contract with Whiteman Clark, said contract having a balance 
of approximately $37,900; including both sums collected and 
held in savings at the time of trial and all future proceeds 
of said contract. 
5e Plaintiff is awarded one-half the stock in United 
Military Underwriters. She is directed to have balance of 
the stock reissued as a separate certificate, and deliver 
the same to the Defendant. If is further ordered that 
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Plaintiff be awarded all household furnishings and effects 
now in her possession, the 1978 Chrysler automobile, the 
1953 Chevrolet truck, the right to collect loans to her 
children and their families in the approximate amount of 
$17,800, two burial lots at memorial Estates, all life and 
cancer policies in her name subject to payment of premiums 
and her personal effects and property* 
6. The Defendant is awarded time certificates: 
#1*6732128 and #146013271, savings accounts: #143009199, 
#063003065 and #143000977, all interest in his business as a 
trucker including his diesel tractor, flatbed trailer, tools 
and equipment, his retirement plan if any, the 1957 Mitchell 
boat with trailer, 1949 International pickup, Honda 
motorcycle, 1974 Ford pickup with camper, his personal 
belongings and effects, trailmobile trailer and 
approximately $4,200 loaned to his business associates and 
fr iends . 
7. Each of the parties is ordered to pay the debts 
separately incurred by him or her and hold the other 
harmless thereon. , 
DATED this ^5 day of yjsjnJtf/ty , 1985. 
By the Court: 
Judge Freder ick 
Approved as to form: 
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Sam King 
Attorney for Defendant 
Utah Code Annotated 3 0-3-5: 
Disposition of property - Maintenance and 
health care of parties and children - court to 
have continuing jurisdiction - Custody and 
visitation - Termination of alimony. 
ll) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the 
court may include in it such orders in 
relation to the children, property and 
parties, and children, as may be equitable* 
The court shall include in every decree of 
divorce an order assigning responsibility for 
the payment of reasonable and necessary 
medical and dental expenses of the dependent 
children. If coverage is available at a 
reasonable cost, the court may also include an 
order requiring the purchase and maintenance 
of appropriate health, hospital, and dental 
care insurance for those children. The court 
shall have continuing jurisdiction to make 
such subsequent changes or new orders with 
respect to the support and maintenance of the 
parties, the custody of the children and their 
support, maintenance, and health and dental 
care, or the distribution of the property as 
shall be reasonable and necessary. Visitation 
rights of parents, grandparents, and other 
relatives shall take into consideration the 
welfare of the child. 
(2) Unless a decree of divorce specifically 
provides otherwise, any order of the court 
that a party pay alimony to a former spouse 
shall automatically terminate upon the 
remarriage of that former spouse, unless that 
marriage is annulled and found to be void ab 
initio, in which case alimony shall resume, 
providing that the party paying alimony be 
made a party to the action of annulment and 
that party's rights are determined. 
(3) Any order of the court that a party pay 
amlimony to a former spouse shall be 
terminated upon application of that party 
establishing that the former spouse is 
residing with a person of the opposite sex, 
unless it is further established by the person 
receiving alimony that the relationship or 
association between them is without any sexual 
contact. 
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35-1-62 Utah Code Annotated: 
Injuries or death caused by wrongful acts of third 
parties—Remedies of employee—Rights of employer 
or insurance carrier in cause of action—Maintenance 
of action—Disbursement of proceeds of recovery,— 
When any injury or death for which compensation is 
payable under this title shall have been caused by 
the wrongful act or neglect of another person not 
in the same employment, the injured employee, or 
in case of death his dependents, may claim compensa-
tion and the injured employee or his heirs or personal 
representative may also have an action for damages 
against such third person. If compensation is claimed 
and the employer or insurance carrier becomes obligated 
to pay compensation, the employer or insurance carrier 
shall become trustee of the cause of action either 
in its own name or in the name of the injured employee, 
or his heirs or the personal representative of the 
deceased, provided the employer or carrier may not 
settle and release the cause of action without the 
consent of the commission. 
(3) The balance shall be paid to the injured employee 
or his heirs in case of death, to be applied to reduce 
or satisfy in full any obligation thereafter accruing 
against the person liable for compensation. 
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35-1-65. Utah Code Annotated: 
Temporary disability—Amount of payments--"State 
average weekly wage" defined.--(1) In case of tempor-
ary disability, the employee shall receive 66 2/3% 
of his average weekly wages at the time of the 
injury so long as such disability is total, but not 
more than a maximum of 66 2/3% of the state average 
weekly wage at the time of the injury per week and 
not less than a miniumum of $35 per week plus $5 
for a dependent wife and $5 for each dependent minor 
child under the age of eighteen years, up to a 
maximum of four such dependent minor children, but 
not to exceed 66 2/3% of the state average weekly 
wage at the time of the injury per week. In no case 
shall such compensation benefits exceed 312 weeks 
at the rate of 66 2/3% of the state average weekly 
wage at the time of the injury over a period of 
eight years from the date of the injury. 
(2) The "state average weekly wage" as referred to 
in chapters 1 and 2 of this Title shall be determined 
by the commission as follows: on or before June 1 
of each year, the total wages reported on contribu-
tion reports to the department of employment security 
under the commission for the preceding calendar year 
shall be divided by the average monthly number of 
insured workers determined by dividing the total 
insured workers reported for the preceding year by 
twelve. The average annual wage thus obtained shall 
be divided by 52, and the average weekly wage thus 
determined rounded to the nearest dollar. The state 
average weekly wage as so determined shall be used 
as the basis for computing the maximum compensation 
rate for injuries or disabilities arising from occu-
pational disease which occurred during the twelve-
month period commencing July 1 following the June 1 
determination, and any death resulting therefrom. 
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35-1-81. Utah Code Annotated: 
Awards—Medical, nursing, hospital and burial expenses-
Artificial limb or eye—Artificial appliances.-—-In 
addition to the compesation provided for this title 
the employer or insurance carrier, or the commission 
of finance out of the state insurance fund, shall in 
ordinary cases also be required to pay such reasonable 
sum for medical, nurse and hospital services, and for 
medicines, and for such artificial means and appliances 
as may be necessary to treat the patient as in the 
judgment of the industrial commission may be just, 
and in case death results from the injury, it shall 
also require the employer or insurance carrier, or the 
commission of finance out of the state insurance fund, 
to pay the burial expenses, in ordinary cases not 
exceeding the sum of $1,000. [Emphasis added] 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
HELEN NARANJO, 
PLAINTIFF, 
VS. 
JOSE J. NARANJO, 
DEFENDANT. 
CASE NO. D-83-3755 
BEFORE THE HONORABLE J. DENNIS FREDERICK, JUDGE 
COURT'S RULING 
NOVEMBER 16, 1984 
APPEARANCES: 
FOR THE PLAINTIFF: 
FOR THE DEFENDANT 
KATHRYN SCHULER DENHOLM 
660 SOUTH 200 EAST 
SUITE 100 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111 
SAMUEL KING 
2120 SOUTH 1300 EAST 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111 
i e f t i l l r i Service 
712 Newhouse Building 
10 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Phone (801) 531-0256 
Susan K. Hellberg, C.S.R., R.P.R. 
License #190 
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1
 P R O C E E D I N G S 
2 THE COURT: FOR THE RECORD, COUNSEL AND THE 
3 PARTIES ARE PRESENT. I HAVE NOW REVIEWED THE EXHIBITS 
4
 SUBMITTED IN THIS MATTER, AND I AM PREPARED TO RULE. BASED 
5 UPON THE EVIDENCE THAT'S BEEN ELICITED, THE PARTIES ARE BOTH 
6
 ON THE COMPLAINT AND THE COUNTERCLAIM GRANTED A DIVORCE ON 
1 THE GROUNDS OF MENTAL CRUELTY, THE SAME TO BECOME FINAL 
8 UPON ENTRY. 
9 IT IS THIS COURT'S VIEW THAT WHEN PARTIES MARRY, 
10 THEY AGREE TO--AND, IN THIS CASE, DID POOL THEIR RESPECTIVE 
11 ASSETS IN AN EFFORT TO BETTER THEIR MARRIAGE. TO ATTEMPT 
12 TO RECONSTRUCT EACH ITEM ATTRIBUTED THROUGHOUT THE COURSE 
13 OF THE MARRIAGE AS WELL AS THE ITEMS BROUGHT INTO THE 
14 MARRIAGE BY THE PARTIES, IN THIS COURT'S VIEW WOULD NOT BE 
15 PRODUCTIVE OR FRUITFUL. THIS COURT CAN'T PREDICT WHAT WILL 
16 HAPPEN IN THE FUTURE WITH REGARD TO THE EMPLOYABILITY OF 
17 EITHER PARTY. IT MUST CONTENT ITSELF WITH THE CIRCUMSTANCES 
18 AS THEY NOW EXIST. 
19 BUT, OF COURSE, AS COUNSEL ARE AWARE, THIS COURT 
20 I MAINTAINS CONTINUING JURISDICTION TO MODIFY ANY ORDER THAT IT 
21 | ENTERS WITH REGARD TO CIRCUMSTANCES THAT MAY DEVELOP IN THE 
22 FUTURE IF THEY MEET THE TEST OF MATERIAL OR SUBSTANTIAL 
23 CHANGE IN CIRCUMSTANCES. HOWEVER, BASED UPON THE EVIDENCE 
24 THAT'S BEEN PRESENTED IN THIS MATTER, MY RULING IS AS FOLLOWS 
25 WITH REGARD TO THE DISTRIBUTION OF THE PROPERTY: THE BURIAL 
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LOTS ARE TO BE DIVIDED EQUALLY, EACH PARTY GETTING TWO LOTS. 
THE STOCK IN NMU IS TO BE DIVIDED EQUALLY, EACH PARTY TO 
OBTAIN 32,400 SHARES. 
THE ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE AS SET FORTH IN EXHIBIT 5 
ARE DIVIDED AS FOLLOWS: $9,835 TO THE PLAINTIFF, $8,000 TO 
THE PLAINTIFF, $1,000 TO THE DEFENDANT, AND $3,200 TO THE 
DEFENDANT. THE HOME IN THIS CASE IS AWARDED TO THE PLAINTIFF 
FOR HER USE SUBJECT TO MAINTAINING THE MORTGAGE PAYMENTS AND 
THE EXPENSES INCIDENT TO THE OPERATING OF THE HOME AND THAT 
THEY BE KEPT CURRENT SUBJECT, HOWEVER, TO A LIEN ON THE 
EQUITY IN THE HOME TO THE DEFENDANT IN THE SUM OF $31,121.' 
I HAVE MADE THIS DETERMINATION BASED UPON EXHIBIT 14 THAT THE 
HOME HAS A PRESENT MARKET VALUE OF $75,000 LESS THE MORTGAGE 
BALANCE OF $12,178, THE RESULTING FIGURE I HAVE DIVIDED BY 
2. 
THE LIEN OF THE DEFENDANT IS TO BE PAID TO HIM AT 
THE EARLIER OF THE FOLLOWING EVENTS: ONE, THE REMARRIAGE OF 
THE PLAINTIFF OR CO-HABITATION WITH A MEMBER OF THE OPPOSITE 
SEX WITHOUT THE BENEFIT OF MARRIAGE. TWO, THE PLAINTIFF 
EITHER SELLS THE HOME OR NO LONGER USES IT AS HER PRIMARY 
RESIDENCE, OR FIVE YEARS, WHICHEVEROCCURS SOONER. IN THE 
EVENT THE PLAINTIFF DETERMINES TO SELL THE HOME, THE 
DEFENDANT IS GIVEN THE RIGHT OF FIRST REFUSAL TO BUY THE 
HOME FOR THE SUM OFFERED AS RECEIVED BY THE PLAINTIFF 
APPLYING, OF COURSE, HIS LIEN INTEREST TOWARD THE PURCHASE 
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PRICE, WHICH LIEN INTEREST WILL ACCRUE NO INTEREST. 
THE PERSONAL PROPERTY OF EACH OF THE PARTIES IS 
AWARDED TO THEM. THE HOUSEHOLD FURNITURE IN THE HOME IS 
AWARDED TO THE PLAINTIFF ON WHICH I PLACE A VALUE OF $3,000. 
THE DEFENDANT IS AWARDED HIS RETIREMENT, WHATEVER THAT MAY 
BE, FREE AND CLEAR OF ANY CLAIM OF THE PLAINTIFF. THE 
LIFE AND CANCER INSURANCE POLICIES ARE AWARDED TO THE 
RESPECTIVE PARTIES SUBJECT TO THE OBLIGATION IF THEY WISH 
TO KEEP THEM IN EFFECT TO PAY THE PREMIUMS THEREON. 
THE FOLLOWING ITEMS ARE AWARDED TO THE PLAINTIFF 
AS HER SOLE AND SEPARATE PROPERTY: THE FAMILY DEBTS AS I 
HAVE PREVIOUSLY OUTLINED THEM IN THE AMOUNT OF $17,835; THE 
CHRYSLER AUTOMOBILE, VALUE $1,800; THE HOUSEHOLD FURNITURE 
AS I HAVE INDICATED IN THE VALUE OF $3,000; THE '53 CHEVROLET 
PICKUP WITH A VALUE OF $100; THE WHITEMAN CLARK NOTE OF A 
VALUE OF $37,900, WHICH I ANTICIPATE WILL BE PAID AT A MONTHL 
RATE OF $375 PURSUANT TO MR. SCHOENHALS' LETTER, WHICH 
ITEMS, ACCORDING TO MY CALCULATIONS, TOTAL THE SUM OF 
$60,635. 
THE FOLLOWING ITEMS ARE AWARDED TO THE DEFENDANT 
FREE AND CLEAR OF ANY CLAIM OF THE PLAINTIFF: DEBTS IN THE 
SUM OF $4,200 THAT I HAVE PREVIOUSLY REFERRED TO; THE 
KENWORTH TRUCK WITH A VALUE OF $8,000; THE TIRES AND TOOLS 
WITH A VALUE OF $2,000; THE HONDA 360, VALUE $300; THE 
INTERNATIONAL PICKUP, VALUE $200; THE BOAT AND TRAILER, 
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VALUE $1,000; THE FORD PICKUP AND CAMPER, $3,000; AND THE 
TRAILMOBILE TRAILER, $4,500; THE ZIONS BANK CERTIFICATES OF 
DEPOSIT IN THE AMOUNT OF $31,998; THE SAVINGS CERTIFICATE 
IDENTIFIED IN EXHIBIT 17 IN THE AMOUNT OF $6,400; THE SAVINGS 
CERTIFICATE IN THE AMOUNT OF $400, LIKEWISE IDENTIFIED IN 
EXHIBIT 17, AND THE SAVINGS CERTIFICATE IN THE AMOUNT OF 
$7,400 IDENTIFIED IN THE SAME EXHIBIT, WHICH ITEMS TOTAL 
$67,598. 
THE CONTINUING USE OF THE GARAGE BY THE DEFENDANT, 
IN THIS COURT'S VIEW, IS NOT A FEASIBLE, WORKABLE ARRANGE-
MENT. ACCORDINGLY, THE DEFENDANT IS DIRECTED TO MOVE OUT OF 
HOME AS SOON AS IS PRACTICABLE AND REMOVE HIS BELONGINGS 
FROM THERE. THE DEFENDANT IS IN ADDITION ORDERED TO PAY 
ALIMONY TO THE PLAINTIFF IN THE SUM OF $800 PER MONTH. EACH 
PARTY IS DIRECTED TO PAY THEIR OWN ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS. 
NOW, I RECOGNIZE, COUNSEL, THAT THERE IS SOME 
DISPARITY IN THE CALCULATION OF THE RESPECTIVE AWARDS. HOW-
EVER, IT IS MY VIEW THAT TAKING INTO ACCOUNT THE PERSONAL 
INJURY AWARD, BECAUSE I AM UNABLE—THE EVIDENCE HAS NOT 
ESTABLISHED WHAT PORTION OF THAT REPRESENTED, IF ANY, LOST 
WAGES VERSUS PAIN AND SUFFERING THAT THE PLAINTIFF, BY 
VIRTUE OF ANY AWARD, IS SHARING IN THAT AWARD. BUT AT THE 
SAME TIME, I HAVE ATTEMPTED TO DISTRIBUTE THE PROPERTY AS 
EQUALLY AS I AM ABLE IN LIGHT OF THE FIGURES AND THE EVIDENCE 
THAT I HAVE BEEN PRESENTED. AS I STATED AT THE OUTSET, THIS 
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COURT WILL MAINTAIN CONTINUING JURISDICTION IN THE EVENT 
THERE IS A SUBSTANTIAL CHANGE IN THE MATERIAL CIRCUMSTANCES 
OF THE PARTIES AND CERTAINLY WILL RECONSIDER, IF NECESSARY, 
ANY FACTUAL CIRCUMSTANCE THAT CAUSES SUCH A CHANGE. 
MR. KING, I WILL ASK YOU TO PREPARE THE FINDINGS 
OF FACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND DECREE, SUBMIT THEM TO 
MS. DENHOLM PURSUANT TO RULE 4 FOR APPROVAL. 
NOW, ARE THERE ANY QUESTIONS? 
MR. KING: I HAVE ONE, YOUR HONOR. YOU REFERRED TO 
A $31,000 SAVINGS CERTIFICATE, AND UNLESS YOU HAVE COMBINED 
OTHER CERTIFICATES, I'M NOT AWARE OF ANY SUCH CERTIFICATE. 
THE COURT: EXCUSE ME, MR. KING. EXHIBIT 21 
REPRESENTED PHOTOCOPIES OF TWO CERTIFICATES OF DEPOSIT OF 
ZIONS FIRST NATIONAL BANK, ONE IN THE AMOUNT OF $10,000, AND 
THE OTHER IN THE AMOUNT OF $21,000, ALMOST $22,000. AM I 
TO UNDERSTAND THAT THAT'S THE TOTAL SAVINGS BETWEEN THE 
PARTIES? 
MR. KING: IT'S NOT THE TOTAL SAVINGS; IT'S THE 
ONLY CERTIFICATES. 
THE COURT: YOU REFER IN YOUR ASSET COLUMN ON 
EXHIBIT 16 TO SAVINGS CERTIFICATES, THREE SEPARATE SAVINGS 
CERTIFICATES IN THE AMOUNTS OF SIXTY-FOUR HUNDRED, FOUR 
HUNDRED, AND SEVENTY-FOUR HUNDRED DOLLARS, AND IN ADDITION, 
YOU REFER IN EXHIBIT 16 TO TIME CERTIFICATES IN THE AMOUNT 
OF $12,000 AS WELL AS $24,000. NOW, BASED UPON THAT, IT IS 
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MY VIEW THAT THERE WERE A TOTAL OF FIVE SEPARATE CERTIFI-
CATES OR SAVINGS ACCOUNTS. IS THAT NOT CORRECT? 
MR. KING: COUNSEL, HAVE I GOT THESE MISDESIG-
NATED? THE SIXTY-FOUR HUNDRED, THE FOUR HUNDRED, AND 
SEVENTY-FOUR HUNDRED ARE SAVINGS ACCOUNTS? 
MS. DENHOLM: I THINK THEY LOOK TO BE MORE CON-
SISTENT WITH SAVINGS ACCOUNTS THAN SAVINGS CERTIFICATES. 
MR. KING: THE TOTAL IS SAVINGS ASSETS. 
THE COURT: WHAT I INTEND BY MY RULING IS THAT THE 
ZIONS CD'S ARE AWARDED TO THE DEFENDANT, AND IN ADDITION, 
THOSE ITEMS, SIXTY-FOUR HUNDRED, FOUR HUNDRED AND SEVENTY-
FOUR HUNDRED ARE LIKEWISE AWARDED TO THE DEFENDANT. 
MS. DENHOLM: NOW, DOES THAT INCLUDE THE SAVINGS? 
THE COURT: THE BRIGHTON BANK CHECKING ACCOUNT IS 
AWARDED TO THE PLAINTIFF, AND THAT LISTED ON EXHIBIT 16 IS 
$2,600. 
MS. DENHOLM: YOUR HONOR, WOULD THE PROCEEDS FROM 
THE NOTE THAT ARE NOW HELD IN A SAVINGS ACCOUNT, THEN, BE 
AWARDED TO THE PLAINTIFF AS INTEREST IN THAT NOTE? 
THE COURT: THAT IS CORRECT. 
NOW, ANY FURTHER QUESTIONS? VERY WELL. COURT 
WILL BE IN RECESS. 
MR. KING: HOW LONG WOULD MR. NARANJO HAVE TO 
VACATE THE HOME? 
THE COURT: HOW LONG DOES HE NEED? 
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1 MR. NARANJO: I HAVE NO IDEA. I AM GOING TO HAVE 
2 TO FIND A PLACE TO PUT ALL MY STUFF. 
3 THE COURT: WELL, WHAT I WOULD SUGGEST, MR. 
4
 KING, IT APPEARS TO ME THAT COUNSEL HAS BEEN ABLE TO WORK 
5 AMICABLY IN THIS CASE, AND CERTAINLY I WOULD HOPE THAT THAT 
6 CONTINUES. CERTAINLY YOU NEED A REASONABLE TIME TO FIND 
7 ANOTHER LOCATION TO MOVE YOUR EQUIPMENT AND TOOLS. THE 
8 PRINCIPAL CONCERN IS TO HAVE YOU MOVE AND GET ANOTHER LOCA-
9 TION AND THEN REMOVE YOUR ITEMS AND TOOLS AND SO ON THAT GO 
10 WITH THE TRUCK AS SOON AS YOU ARE ABLE. MY NOTION WOULD BE 
11 THAT THAT CAN PROBABLY BE ACCOMPLISHED WITHIN A MATTER OF A 
12 COUPLE OF WEEKS. 
13 MS. DENHOLM: I WOULD THINK SO. 
14 THE COURT: THAT IS, AT LEAST, YOUR MOVE. SO FAR 
15 AS THE TRUCK IS CONCERNED, IF IT REQUIRES A LONGER TIME, 
16 THEN I WOULD SUGGEST YOU DISCUSS IT WITH COUNSEL AND SEE 
17 IF YOU CANNOT AGREE UPON A TIME WHEREBY HE WILL BE MOVED 
18 OUT. 
19 MR. KING: DOES THE COURT INCLUDE IN THIS ORDER 
20 THAT SHE SHOULD HAVE THAT CERTIFICATE ON UNITED MILITARY 
21 UNDERWRITERS REISSUED IN BOTH NAMES? 
22 THE COURT: THAT IS CORRECT. I AM DIRECTING THAT 
23 BOTH PARTIES DO WHAT IS NECESSARY TO MAKE THE DISTRIBUTION 
24 THAT I HAVE RULED, AND THAT WOULD REQUIRE THE NECESSITY OF 
25 THE ISSUANCE OF SEPARATE CERTIFICATES FOR THEIR STOCK 
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S A M U E L K I N G 
A T T O R N E V A T L A W 
3 d G U M P & A Y £ P S B U i L O ' N G 
2<20 S O U T H 3 0 0 E A S T 
SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 8^lOG 
T E L E P H O N E ( S O I ) - * 8 © - 3 7 5 i 
June 8, 1982 
Mre Jose Naranjo 
7593 West 3500 South 
Magna, Utah 84044 
Dear Jose: 
Following is my accounting to you of disbursement of the verdict 
against Gary Energy: 
$110,000.00 
1,608.65 
$108,391.35 
18,000.00 
$ 90,391.35 
30,130.45 
$ 60,260c90 
1,198.55 
$ 61,459.45 
Gross settlement 
Costs as per ledger 
State Insurance Fund 
Net settlement 
Attorney fees, 1/3 of net settlement 
Net to you 
Refund of costs paid by you 
Total due you 
The settlement with the State Insurance Fund is as per statute 
on what your future benefits are, which are none until you have 
used up your share of the settlement, your share being $60,260.90. 
However, as the settlement is a reduction of the initial amount 
of the $120,000 verdict plus interest and costs, I got the State 
to come down from the approximately $25,000 they have paid out 
so far to a total of $18,000. That difference of approximately 
$7,000 goes to you to increase your cash in hand. 
In my opinion, your entire recovery of $60,260.90 is not subject 
to taxes, representing only a partial reimbursement to you of pain, 
suffering and disability you received from the accident. 
My check to you for $61,459.45 is enclosed. 
As you know, the State authorized me to act to recover the bene-
fits you have received. The State will be paying me and Bill 
Prakken a fee-from the $18,000. That is entirely separate from 
the fees you pay us and is not in any way chargeable against you. 
If wish you the best of luck and hope that in the future I can 
find some other people to work with as fine as you. 
Sincerely, 
SAMUEL KING 
SK/has 
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Orthopedic Surgery & Fractures 
Joint Arthroscopy/Microsurgery 
Herniated Disc Injections 
Arthritis 
Thermography 
JONATHAN H. HORNE, MJD. 
5770 South 250 East #110 
Murray. Utah 84107 
Telephone (801)266-3399 
November 5, 1984 Fellow American Academy of Orthopedic Surgery 
Western Orthopedic Association 
International Arthroscopic Association 
Diplomate 
American Board of Orthopedic Surgery 
Mr. Samuel King 
Attorney-At-Law 
Samuel King & Associates 
301 Gump & Ayers Building 
2120 South 1300 East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 8^106 
Dear Mr. King: 
Re: Jose Naranjo 
You requested the answers to some questions regarding your client and 
my patient, Jose Naranjo. 
Evaluation of his knee was performed. He has some limitation of motion. 
He has motion onl) to 130 degrees, 10 degrees poorer than he had two 
years ago. X-rays demonstrate arthritic changes of the joint, along 
the medial and lateral femoral condyles, some narrowing of the joint-space, 
but as of yet, not enough to require arthroplasty procedures or total 
knee replacements. 
The patient has complaint mainly, of pain in the morning when he arises 
which improves during the day with activity, and pain with weather changes. 
These are typical signs of post-traumatic degenerative arthritis. 
His knee problems are directly attributable to the truck accident in 
question. His knee will not improve from this time forward, but will 
slowly deteriorate. 
Whether he will need an arthroplasty or total knee procedure, major 
debridement of the joint within the next five to ten years is conjectural, 
but with the deterioration of his condition the last two years, the amount 
of arthritis that is demonstrated on the x-r^y, I believe that he will 
probably need some type of debridement such as an arthroscopic debridement 
of the joint the next five years. I believe that he will probably need 
a total knee replacement or major arthroplasty in 10-15 years. 
I believe he probably will be able to continue working for five or ten years, 
but his condition may deteriorate rapidly, and it may be only another two 
to five years. 
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OWNERSHIP IN NMU COMPANY. 
COURT IS NOW IN RECESS. 
CPROCEEDINGS CONCLUDED.) 
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:D THIS/7) 7 DAY OF 
1
 I CERTIFICATE OF .REPORTER 
2 
3
 I I, SUSAN K. HELLBERG, AN OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER 
4
 FOR THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE 
5 COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, DO HEREBY CERTIFY THAT I REPORTED 
6 STENOGRAPHICALLY THE COURT'S RULING IN THE MATTER OF HELEN 
^ NARANJO VS. JOSE J. NARANJO, CASE NO. D-83-3755, AND THAT 
8 THE ABOVE AND FOREGOING IS A TRUE AND CORRECT TRANSCRIPT OF 
9 SAID RULING DATED NOVEMBER 16, 1984, ACCORDING TO MY ORIGINAL 
10 STENOTYPE NOTES. 
11 I DATE S /7) /~  NOVEMBER, 1984 
12 
13 
CERTIFIED SHORTHAND REPORTER j-"" 
15 I L/ 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
10 
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Mr. Samuel King 
Attorney-At-Law 
His function ability is already impaired and will continue to become 
more impaired in the next few years to come. At the present time, he 
cannot perform vigorous activity. He can sit in the truck, push the 
clutch and reasonably function in that capacity, but he cannot walk 
more than a few blocks without discomfort increasing. 
I feel that the probability of requiring a debridement of the joint 
such a§ by an arthroscopy or synovectomy, debridement of loose cartilage 
and/or,arthritic spurs is 80 to 100 percent in the next five to ten years. 
He .may-k require ©pre,- thao^one. 
The probabilty .of,requiring either a fusion or a total knee arthroplasty, 
I belieye, is higher than 15 percent. I believe that the probability is 
50 percent in the next ten to fifteen years. 
JHH:pr 
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COURTfS AWARD 
TO WIFE 
$31,411 1/2 present home (Magna) 
$17,83 5 Accounts receivable 
1,000 2 burial lots 
3,000 household furniture 
1,800 1978 Chrysler 
100 1953 Chevrolet pickup 
37,900 Wightman-Clark contract 
(yield $375/month) 
2,000 Brighton Bank account 
16,200 1/2 National Military 
$111,846 
Alimony - $800/month 
Magna Home - 1/2 equity to wife. 
fixed at $31,411, when plaintiff 
whichever sooner. 
TO HUSBAND 
$31,411 
4,200 
1,000 
8,000 
1,000 
1,000 
300 
200 
1,000 
3,000 
4,500 
$31,998 
6,400 
400 
7,400 
16,200 
1/2 present home, 
Magna 
Accounts Receivable 
2 burial lots 
Kenworth truck 
Tires 
Tools 
Honda 3 60 
1949 Inter. Pickup 
Boat and trailer 
1974 Ford Pickup with 
camper 
1977 Trailmobile 
Trailer 
Savings 
Savings 
Savings 
Savings 
1/2 National Military 
Underwriter's stock 
3118,009 
She to pay husband 1/2 equity, 
remarries or five years, 
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DEFENDANT'S INCOME AFTER BUSINESS 
EXPENSES AND BEFORE TAXES PER MONTH 
Mr. Naranjo's income as a self-employed truck driver was 
covered for several years. The gross income, after business 
expenses and before taxes is as follows on a monthly basis: 
$1408.75 - 1982 Tax returns (Ex. 4) 
$1315.00 - 1983 Tax returns (Ex. 3) 
$2324.59 - Year prior to trial, November, 1983, through October, 
i984 (Defendant's Ex. 18) 
$1889.00 - Defendant's income, April, 1984, through June, 1984 
(Plaintiff's Ex. 7). 
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